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Abstract
This paper examines targeting issues that emerge 
from FISP evaluations undertaken since 2006/07, and 
puts forward various options for improving targeting. 
Targeting objectives depend upon programme 
objectives. In the FISP targeting occurs at area and 
beneficiary levels – the former targeting subsidies to 
different zones or districts, the latter targeting 
beneficiaries within already targeted areas. Targeting is 
important because it affects achievement of programme 
objectives through its impacts on displacement (the 
extent to which purchases of subsidised inputs replace 
purchases of unsubsidised inputs that farmers would 
have bought anyway without the subsidy), productivity 
of input use, the direct benefits to beneficiaries, and 
wider economic, social and environmental benefits. 
Achievement of these benefits is generally supported 
by pro-poor targeting (with lower displacement and 
stronger growth linkages) but the effects of pro-poor 
targeting on the productivity of input use are not known 
and are an important (but difficult) field of further 
research. Relations of targeting with area and beneficiary 
graduation and with environmental benefits are 
complex, and also require further research.
1. Introduction
Targeting plays a critical role in the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP), as it determines who gets how much 
of what inputs under the programme, and hence how 
these inputs are used and their varied impacts: on 
household and national production, food self-sufficiency 
and food security; beneficiary households’ asset building 
and graduation; maize prices and ganyu wage rates; 
vulnerable groups’ welfare (such as female, elderly or 
child headed households, or people with chronic 
illnesses or disabilities); unsubsidised sales’ displacement 
by subsidised sales; relationships within rural 
communities and commitment to development 
activities; and overall social and economic returns to 
economic and fiscal investment in the programme. 
Targeting is controversial, as it determines whether or 
not, how and how much particular people and groups 
will benefit from the programme. Targeting is also 
difficult –and the large scale of the programme across 
the country adds to the challenges and costs in 
implementing and supervising targeting. 
This discussion paper sets out issues that emerge from 
the 2010/11 FISP evaluation and earlier evaluations 
regarding targeting, and suggests various options that 
may be considered to improve targeting. We begin in 
section 2 by setting out the objectives of targeting and 
its potential impacts. This leads on, in section 3, to 
consideration of the processes and stages of targeting, 
interpreted broadly as the determinants of the final 
pattern of access to subsidised inputs. In the light of this, 
section 4 reviews targeting outcomes observed over the 
course of the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
(AISP) and FISP. Section 5 then sets out various options 
for improving targeting. Section 6 concludes. ]
2. Targeting Objectives and 
Impacts
Targeting objectives depend upon the overall 
objectives of the programme. Table 1 illustrates how 
these may be related. It does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive description of the range of possible 
programme objectives, nor to explore in any depth their 
implications for targeting and targeting objectives. It 
does, however, introduce key issues that need to be 
considered about the impacts of targeting and the critical 
outcomes that targeting systems attempt to influence.
The different objectives in table 1 are related in two 
ways. First some of them are complementary, as shown 
by the similarities and overlaps in targeting objectives 
and implications. This is made explicit by labelling them 
in groups (A, B, C etc). A different set of relationships 
between targeting systems, outcomes and impacts are 
set out in Figure 1.
Figure 1 distinguishes between the targeting system 
(intentions, implementation and costs), targeting 
outcomes (the number of beneficiaries, the inputs received 
per beneficiary, the characteristics of beneficiaries, and 
the characteristics of areas in which the beneficiaries 
reside and farm), and targeting impacts. These interact with 
other policies and stakeholder interests. The targeting 
system influences targeting outcomes through broad 
targeting design and implementation (determining 
the quantities of subsidised inputs in different areas, 
and hence the characteristics of areas receiving inputs 
and of potentially eligible beneficiaries) and through 
more detailed processes of coupon allocation, issue and 
redemption (determining the quantities of subsidised 
inputs received by different individuals and households, 
and hence the characteristics of beneficiaries and the 
number of beneficiaries receiving different input 
combinations). These of course interact. We examine the 
targeting system and implementation processes in more 
detail later, in section 3, but note here that intentions 
are commonly modified or subverted to some extent 
during implementation, and this needs to be explicitly 
allowed for in targeting system design. 
The key targeting impacts in Figure 1 are concerned 
with four key processes which determine the subsidy 
programme’s effectiveness in achieving the different 
objectives listed in Table 1: 
•	 Displacement
•	 Productivity	
•	 Economy-wide	effects
•	 Graduation	
We discuss each of these, and their links with targeting, 
in turn.
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Table 1 Programme objectives and their implications for targeting
Programme 
Objective
Targeting objectives Implications
A1 Increased 
production
Maximise incremental input 
use (minimise displacement) & 
productivity of incremental 
input use. 
Identify geographical areas & household types 
with low displacement (ie unable to buy 
unsubsidised inputs) & high input use efficiency 
– poorer able bodied ‘good’ farmers in productive 
maize growing areas?
A2 National food self 
sufficiency
As above As above
B1 Beneficiary 
household food 
self sufficiency
Target food deficit/insecure 
households in productive 
maize growing areas & able to 
redeem the coupons & use the 
inputs effectively – comple-
mentary safety nets to aid 
financing of redemption by 
poor targeted households
Identify such households
B2 Beneficiary 
household food 
security
As in B1 above As in B1 above
B3 Social protection 
for beneficiaries
Target most vulnerable 
households in productive 
maize growing areas & able to 
redeem the coupons & use the 
inputs effectively
Identify such households. Complementary safety 
nets to aid financing of redemption
C1 Wider household 
food security 
As in (A1) above, Complementary policies to promote access to 
maize markets with low & stable prices in rural 
and urban areas, higher ganyu wages, comple-
mentary social protection (eg cash transfers)
C2 Social protection 
for all households
As in (C1) above As in (C1) above
C3 Poverty reducing 
broad based 
growth
Some combination of (B2), B3 
and (C1) above, 
Combination depends on the relative effective-
ness/ efficiency of direct impacts for targeted 
beneficiaries and indirect impacts benefiting the 
poor more generally
D Programme 
graduation – area
As in (C3) Together with development of (private sector) 
input supply systems and produce markets
E Programme 
graduation 
– households
As in (B1) May need mechanisms to help beneficiary 
household saving / other forms of affording input 
access to enable graduation (ability to afford 
unsubsidised fertiliser) after specified time as 
programme beneficiary
F Environmental	
protection
As in (C3) Together with focus on areas with fragile and 
sloping soils, particular land pressure and 
pressure on forested hills. Complementary 
promotion of integrated soil fertility 
management
2.1	Displacement
Displacement	 describes	 the	 process	 whereby	
households’ access to subsidised inputs causes them to 
reduce their purchases of unsubsidised inputs so that 
the incremental input use as a result of the subsidy is 
less than the amount of subsidised inputs received. 
Displacement	 rates	 are	 affected	 by	 beneficiary	
characteristics (their access to cash, land and labour), 
input and output prices, and market access - but 
displacement is difficult to estimate. Analysis of panel 
household survey data gave estimates of 22%, 3% and 
15% in 2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11, taking account of 
input and output price changes on specific households 
who previously (in 2004/5) bought unsubsidised fertiliser 
(Ricker-Gilbert	et	al.,	2010,Ricker-Gilbert	and	Jayne,	2010,	
Chirwa et al., 2011).
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None of these estimates allow for displacement of 
unsubsidised fertiliser by diverted subsidised fertiliser 
that was not bought by smallholders (suggesting an 
underestimate) nor of the potential for the subsidy 
programme to stimulate unsubsidised purchases as a 
result of its impacts on farm household wealth and ability 
to finance unsubsidised purchases (suggesting an over-
estimate). Irrespective of differences in bias between 
these estimates, however, all estimates agree that there 
is less displacement with poorer households (unless they 
sell their coupons, which may be under-estimated in the 
household surveys). It is also likely, although the empirical 
evidence is mixed, that displacement will be lower in 
areas where market access is poorer and inputs more 
expensive1. This suggests that to reduce displacement, 
targeting should be aimed at areas with poorer market 
access and a greater proportion of poorer households, 
and, within those areas, at poorer households.
2.2 Productivity
Productivity is best described in terms of incremental 
production per unit of incremental input used (where 
incremental input use per unit of subsidised input is 
determined by the displacement rate). It is affected by 
beneficiaries’ farming skills and knowledge, crop 
management, and ability to apply complementary inputs 
such as seed or organic or inorganic fertiliser and timely 
planting or weeding labour. It will also be affected by 
the overall rate of input application per hectare (and its 
spread across part or all cultivated land) allowing for both 
subsidised and unsubsidised inputs, by time of access 
to inputs, by soils and by rainfall. It is again very difficult 
to estimate, and to our knowledge no reliable or recent 
estimates exist of average productivity, let alone of the 
relative effects of the different determinants of 
productivity	(Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2010).
 As regards implications for targeting, it would seem 
clear that targeting should focus on areas with higher 
productivity potential (as regards rainfall and soils). It is 
not so clear what types of household should be targeted 
to get higher productivity –wealthier households may 
be able to use subsidised inputs more efficiently as a 
result of their being more able to complement them with 
other inputs – but this may not be the case. There is a 
longstanding and large literature that demonstrates 
higher yields per hectare on smaller farmers as compared 
with larger farms, but this may or may not mean higher 
returns to other inputs. If less poor farms offer higher 
returns then there may be trade-offs between 
displacement and productivity gains affecting the type 
of beneficiary that gives the highest incremental 
production per unit of subsidy. This is important if the 
programme is aiming to increase production or national 
food self-sufficiency. However if the programme is 
intended to benefit poorer households or to promote 
wider economic growth then there may be further trade-
offs between maximising production and promoting 
gains to poorer beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
2.3	Economy-wide	effects
Economy-wide	effects	of	the	subsidy	programme	are	
principally falling maize prices and higher wages with 
increasing labour and land productivity, and consequent 
wider economic growth. Since higher wages and lower 
maize prices are particularly beneficial to the poor (who 
spend more of their total income on food, tend to be net 
Figure 1 Targeting variables and impacts
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maize buyers, and earn more of their income from 
unskilled wages), promotion of these economy-wide 
benefits is aligned with pro-poor growth objectives. 
These benefits will be affected by improved productivity 
(as discussed above), by trade and other policies affecting 
maize prices, and by the distribution of income benefits 
between different types of households in different areas 
(as this affects both the supply and demand of labour 
for ganyu and for off-farm services2) and linkages to wider 
national maize and labour markets. The linkage or 
multiplier effects are difficult to estimate but are likely 
to be higher where poorer households are the main 
income	beneficiaries	(see	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011c).
The implications for targeting are that inputs should 
be focussed on households yielding the greatest 
incremental production benefits (with possible trade-offs 
between higher input productivity and displacement if 
less poor households use inputs more productively). 
Although this corresponds with maximising productivity 
impacts, concerns for wage and linkage impacts 
strengthen arguments for more targeting of poorer 
households	and	poorer	areas.	(Modelling	by	Dorward,	
2010;	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2012	and	reported	by	School	
of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008 finds greater 
effects in poorer areas with higher concentrations of 
poorer people.)
2.4	Graduation
Graduation	is	the	process	by	which	poor,	food	insecure,	
vulnerable households and areas benefit from subsidised 
inputs to the extent that improved assets and livelihood 
opportunities allow these subsidies to be withdrawn 
without reversion to their former poor, food insecure, 
vulnerable state. It is critical in looking both for dynamic 
impacts from the subsidy programme and for programme 
efficiency. Chirwa et al., 2010a distinguish between 
graduation by individual beneficiary households and 
graduation by the rural economy of specific areas. This 
distinction allows identification of key variables affecting 
the potential for graduation. However, determination of 
threshold values and of trade-offs between variables is 
complex and has not been investigated. In addition, the 
potential for individual beneficiary households to 
graduate will be affected by their characteristics and 
initial conditions (for example household size, land 
ownership and quality, dependency ratio, skills, health, 
shocks, assets, social capital, etc), by the size of subsidy 
received each year, the number of years they participate 
in the programme, weather, prices, growth in the wider 
economy of which they are a part and by working capital 
accumulation and/or livelihood diversification. However, 
Chirwa et al.,	2011;	Ricker-Gilbert	and	Jayne,	2011	find	
little evidence of capital accumulation by beneficiary 
households although Chirwa et al., 2011 do find some 
evidence for improvement in participation in education 
and in under-5 children’s health. Similarly, the potential 
for particular areas or economies to graduate will be 
affected by their characteristics (for example population 
density, land quality, location and links to markets, 
economic structure), by the number and nature of 
beneficiary households, by the scale of the subsidy, and 
by changes in the wider environment (prices, weather, 
political change, etc).
The implications for targeting are that if graduation 
is being sought, targeting should try to bring households 
and/or areas over ‘thresholds’. This raises a difficult set of 
questions:
•	 Is	it	better	to	focus	limited	resources	each	year	
and across years on more households or areas 
for whom graduation is easier (with potential 
linkage effects assisting or excluding poorer 
households or areas), or on fewer poorer 
households or areas for whom graduation is 
more difficult (with more limited linkage 
effects)?
•	 What	are	the	graduation	thresholds	for	different	
households and areas?
•	 How	are	households	and/or	areas	for	whom	
graduation is more or less difficult and with 
greater or lesser linkages to be identified?
The answers to these questions have profound 
implications for targeting for graduation.
Figure 2 Relationships between targeting and programme objectives
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2.5 Conclusions
It is clear from this discussion that different targeting 
outcomes (determining which households and areas get 
what subsidised inputs for how many years) have a critical 
influence on the achievement of different objectives. 
Figure 2 presents a broad summary of these influences, 
showing how area and beneficiary targeting (1 and 2) 
may influence displacement and input productivity (3 
and 4, the latter ambiguously), how these in turn 
influence incremental productivity (A) which then, again 
depending upon targeting, influences beneficiary and 
wider programme impacts and potential graduation (the 
major determinants of environmental protection impacts 
are not specified).
Ideally the analysis in Figure 2 would be developed 
further in a decision tree specifying what targeting 
outcomes should be pursued to achieve each objective. 
This is difficult, however, for a number of reasons:
•	 Objectives	may	be	unclear	and	contested	–	with	
different stakeholders pursuing different 
objectives. Political objectives have not been 
explicitly discussed above, but they are critical. 
They are also highly variable (between different 
stakeholders with different interests or 
operating at national, regional or local levels) 
and fluid (changing rapidly as wider political 
concerns change). 
•	 As	the	discussion	above	shows,	there	are	critical	
issues about which we have only limited 
information. Specific information gaps 
highlighted above include limited information 
about differences in displacement, input 
productivity and labour market effects between 
subsidies provided to different households and 
areas, the relative effectiveness of different 
graduation strategies, and appropriate 
thresholds. 
•	 At	 the	heart	of	many	of	 these	 information	
difficulties are difficulties in determining and 
deciding on technical and political trade-offs 
between targeting different households and 
areas, between the size of subsidies per 
beneficiary or per area and the number of 
beneficiaries and areas served.
•	 The	 effectiveness	of	 subsidies	 in	meeting	
different objectives for and through different 
households and areas is also affected by maize 
price policy, by macro-economic conditions, by 
complementary policies, and by programme 
management - as these affect input productivity 
(if they affect, for example, integrated soil 
fertility management, timing of subsidies, or 
provision of extension support), displacement 
(if they affect unsubsidised input prices and 
availability3), and investment in market and 
communications infrastructure. 
It is also important to note, however, that targeting 
outcomes themselves depend critically upon the 
processes of targeting, to which we now turn.
3. Targeting Processes
There are six main stages that lead up to coupon 
redemption and affect the pattern of access to subsidised 
inputs and to subsidy benefits. Although some of these 
are not normally considered to be part of ‘targeting’, they 
affect the targeting outcomes discussed above, and may 
therefore be considered as stages in the ‘targeting 
system’. These are illustrated in figure 3.1
We discuss changes in each of these, and their impacts 
on targeting outcomes, in turn, but note that they can 
also interact, so that beneficiary identification may or 
may not be affected by the setting of targeting criteria, 
depending upon these criteria and upon procedures for 
beneficiary identification. 
Table 2 sets out the main changes in targeting criteria, 
beneficiary identification, and coupon distribution, 
redistribution and redemption from 2005/6 to 2009/10. 
3.1 Targeting criteria and area 
allocations
In broad terms, area targeting has shifted from an 
emphasis on allocating coupons in proportion to maize 
and tobacco crop areas in the first two years of the 
programme to allocating them more in proportion to 
farm households. This is in line with a shift in objectives 
from emphasis on increasing productivity to emphasis 
on improving food self sufficiency of vulnerable groups, 
also reflected in the criteria for targeting beneficiary 
households. However, transitional allocation mechanisms 
were used to avoid an abrupt shift from one system to 
another. From 2006/7 to 2008/9 district allocations were 
also affected by informal ‘supplementary allocations’. The 
Figure 3 Stages in the targeting system
Table 2 Principal changes in targeting processes, 2005/6 to 2009/10
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10
Area targeting criteria District allocation nominally 
by EPA maize & tobacco 
areas, but highly variable 
between districts. Ad hoc 
district allocation of 
supplementary coupons. 
District & EPA allocation by 
maize & tobacco areas, but 
highly variable between 
districts. Ad hoc district 
allocation of supplementary 
coupons.
District & EPA initial allocation by 
farm hh &maize & tobacco areas, 
highly variable between districts. 
Ad hoc allocation of 
supplementary coupons. Overall 
criteria opaque but (with 
exceptions) more in line with farm 
hh / district.
District & EPA initial allocation by farm 
hh & maize & tobacco areas, but 
highly variable between districts. Ad 
hoc district allocation of 
supplementary coupons. Overall 
criteria opaque but (with exceptions) 
more in line with farm hh / district.
District & EPA allocation criteria 
not clear, variable between 
districts. Overall criteria opaque 
but more in line with farm hh / 
district.
Beneficiary targeting 
criteria
Beneficiary selection criteria 
unclear.
Full time smallholder farmers 
unable to afford purchase of 1 
or 2 unsubsidized fertiliser 
bag.
n.a. Resource poor local resident with 
land; guardians looking after physi-
cally challenged. Vulnerable hholds 
(child or female headed, PWLHIV)
Resource poor local resident with 
land; guardians looking after 
physically challenged. Vulnerable 
hholds (elderly, child or female 
headed,PWLHIV)
District/ TA/ Village 
coupon allocations
District allocation by MoAFS 
HQ, Village allocation by TAs,
District allocation by MoAFS 
HQ. Village allocation by DDC, 
ADCs, TAs.
District allocation by MoAFS HQ. 
Village allocation by DDC, ADCs, 
TAs.
District allocation by MoAFS HQ. EPA/
village allocation by MoAFS staff, 
DDC, ADCs, TAs.
District allocation by MoAFS HQ. 
EPA / village allocation by MoAFS 
district staff, DDC, ADCs, TAs.
Beneficiary identifica-
tion / coupon allocation
Largely by TAs, VDCs Systems highly variable 
between areas - by ‘local 
leaders’ TAs, VDCs, MoAFS 
staff. Reallocation by VH 
common.
Systems highly variable between 
areas - by ‘local leaders’ TAs, VDCs, 
MoAFS staff. Reallocation by VH 
common.
Use of farm hhold register, open 
meetings for allocation led by MoAFS 
(participation unclear). Reallocation 
by VH common.
Farm household register, alloca-
tion in MoAFS led open meetings 
(unclear participation). Voter reg.
nos & ID required. Reallocation by 
VH common.
Coupon distribution 
system
See above: allocation and 
distribution simultaneous
See above: allocation and 
distribution simultaneous
Distribution varied, more by 
MoAFS and VDCs. Open disburse-
ment led by MoAFS. 
Redistribution by VH common
Open meetings for disbursement led 
by MoAFS (degree of participation 
unclear). Redistribution by VH 
common
Open meetings led by MoAFS 
(unclear participation). Voter reg. 
numbers & ID required for receipt 
& redemption. Redistribution by 
VH common
Coupon redemption 
systems
Only through SFFRFM & 
ADMARC
Fertilisers also through major 
retailers; flexible maize seed 
coupons through wide range 
of seed retailers 
Fertilisers also through major 
retailers; flexible seed coupons 
through range of seed retailers; 
cotton inputs through ADDs 
Fertilisers also through major retailers; 
flexible seed coupons through range 
of seed retailers; cotton inputs 
through ADDs
Fertilisers only through ADMARC 
& SFFRFM; separate maize & 
legume seed coupons through 
retailers, variable top up for maize 
seed max MK100
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criteria for these, and indeed their precise distribution, 
are somewhat opaque, but they allowed allocations to 
respond, to some extent, to perceived grievances and 
shortages, and to political demands for greater allocations 
in some areas.
Allocations to different areas may also have been affected 
by differential rates of growth in registered farm families 
in	different	areas.	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a	report	very	
rapid increases in Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS) farm family registrations in the central 
region from 2005/6 to 2009/10 (9.1% annual average 
growth in the central region compared with 2.2% in the 
southern region), with both these figures higher than 
the 1% average annual growth in National Statistical 
(NSO) rural household estimates. MoAFS national farm 
family estimates are just over 60% higher than NSO rural 
household estimates. This difference is lower in the 
southern region (44%) and highest in the Central region 
(82%) and as a result MoAFS figures show more farm 
families in the Centre than the South.
Beneficiary targeting criteria also shifted to put more 
emphasis on poor and vulnerable groups, although they 
remain	broad,	as	shown	in	Table	2.	Difficulties	in	applying	
these criteria arise, however, for a number of reasons 
(School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008, 
Dorward	et	al.,	2010,	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a):
1. ambiguities, tensions and contradictions 
among different targeting criteria, related to 
2. difficulties in clearly establishing measures for 
applying these criteria, both of these being 
related to 
3. large numbers of households apparently 
deserving of coupons relative to the number 
of coupons available.
4. village leaders and agricultural extension staff 
involved in beneficiary targeting may not 
consistently apply the set criteria.
Coupon allocation, distribution and redistribution 
processes are therefore critical in determining how far 
targeting criteria are effectively applied.
3.2 Coupon allocation, distribution 
and redistribution processes
Coupons are distributed to districts and areas within 
districts according to their allocations (described above), 
although from 2006/7 to 2008/9 supplementary coupons 
were issued following the initial main coupon issue, and 
the criteria and processes for their allocation and 
distribution appeared to be very opaque (School of 
Oriental	and	African	Studies	et	al.,	2008,	Dorward	et	al.,	
2010). In this section we therefore focus on processes of 
coupon allocation, distribution and redistribution to 
beneficiaries within areas. In the early years of the 
programme coupon allocation and distribution were 
conducted simultaneously. From 2008/9 a three-step 
process was supposed to be followed, first the 
construction of a farm register of all farm families, then 
the allocation of coupons to beneficiary farm families in 
an open meeting, and this was followed later by separate 
distribution of coupons to beneficiaries, again in open 
meetings. The introduction of ‘open meetings’ during the 
allocation and distribution process had two objectives:
a) To ensure that rural households are adequately 
informed about the operation of the AISP and 
have realistic expectations; and
b) To include households in the targeting process, 
removing targeting power from TAs, village 
headmen and agricultural staff to give it to the 
community itself.
Dorward	et	al.,	2010	and	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a	
report on the extent to which open meetings were used 
in coupon allocation, distribution and redistribution in 
2008/9 and 2010/11. There is mixed anecdotal evidence 
regarding the extent to which registration and coupon 
allocation were separate, and this may be linked to 
different understandings of these processes. In both years 
open meetings were reported for coupon allocation and 
distribution by about 80% and 96% of respondents across 
all regions, respectively. However a dramatic increase in 
redistribution in open meetings was reported by 
respondents, rising from 43% to 70%. This was largely 
the result of increased reporting of open meetings for 
redistribution in the south (70% of respondents reported 
this in 2010/11 as compared with 32% in 2008/9)4.
On the whole the response to the use of open meetings 
to	inform	people	about	the	project	was	positive	(Dorward	
et	al.,	2010,	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a).	However,	open	
meetings do not necessarily mean that village members 
actively take part in targeting, it may mean that the list 
of beneficiaries was announced at an open meeting 
following	prior	decision	by	a	committee.	FGD	information	
in 2008/9 suggested that a key factor determining open 
meetings’ success was whether coverage had increased 
or decreased compared to the previous year, but 
separation of registration from distribution was helpful 
because it allowed time for people to find out where 
they	stood	(Dorward	et	al.,	2010).
Comparison	of	information	in	Dorward	et	al.,	2010	and	
Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a	shows	a	marked	increase	in	
the perceived importance of Traditional Authorities and 
VDCs	in	coupon	allocation,	distribution	and	redistribution	
in 2010/11 as compared with 2008/9. In both years they 
were the most important stakeholders in influencing 
coupon allocation and redistribution. Agricultural 
extension staff were perceived to play a relatively minor 
role in coupon allocation and redistribution in both years, 
but were perceived to be the most important stakeholders 
in influencing coupon distribution in 2008/9. In 2010/11, 
however,	Traditional	Authorities	and	VDCs,	agricultural	
extension staff and police were all perceived to have roles 
of roughly equal importance in coupon distribution (with 
the perceived importance of the police increasing from 
2008/9 to 2010/11).
Considerable differences are reported between coupon 
allocation and receipt, as a result of (a) changes in 
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allocation before distribution and (b) redistribution of 
coupons after initial distribution.
•	 A	number	of	key	informants	and	Focus	Group	
Discussions	(FGDs)	reported	changes	in	coupon	
allocations between initial allocations and 
distribution, and these were usually associated 
with accusations of coupon diversion by key 
stakeholders (agricultural extension staff and 
VDC	members).	 However,	 some	 of	 these	
accusations appear to be associated with a (mis) 
understanding that all households were 
supposed	to	receive	coupons	(Dorward	and	
Chirwa, 2011a). 
•	 As	noted	earlier,	the	proportion	of	households	
reporting receipt of one fertiliser coupon (as a 
result of redistribution) has increased over the 
life of the programme due to a high (though 
relatively constant) rate of coupon redistribution 
in the south and an increasing proportion of 
coupons being allocated to the south. 
This description of targeting processes shows that there 
have been a number of changes intended to improve 
targeting criteria and processes. These positive 
developments do not, however, appear to overcome the 
fundamental difficulties of lack of clarity in targeting 
criteria, of large numbers of households apparently 
satisfying criteria, and of inconsistent application of 
criteria by local leaders and government staff. The 
substantial redistribution of coupons by local leaders is 
partly a response to these difficulties, and we therefore 
now turn to consider how targeting outcomes have 
changed over the life of the programme.
4. Targeting Outcomes
Targeting outcomes can be considered in terms of 
area and beneficiary targeting. Information on area 
targeting outcomes (by region and district) is available 
for each year of the programme from records of coupon 
distribution and fertiliser and seed sales. Information on 
beneficiary targeting outcomes is only available from 
household surveys conducted in 2006/7.
4.1 Area targeting outcomes
As noted in section 3.1, area allocations shifted from 
an emphasis on allocating coupons in proportion to crop 
areas in the first two years of the programme to making 
them more proportionate to the number of farm 
households in each area. At the same time total allocations 
increased from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and then declined in 
subsequent years. Figure 4 shows the changing pattern 
of maize fertiliser redemptions per household by region 
from 2005/6 to 2010/11.
The following observations are of interest from Figure 
4:
•	 There	have	been	substantial	differences	 in	
fertiliser supply over the life of the programme, 
with it rising from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and then 
falling back to 2009/10, with the same supply 
in 2010/11. 
•	 There	are	also	substantial	differences	between	
regions in subsidised fertiliser availability per 
household, but these regional differences have 
declined over time as area allocations were 
increasingly tied to areas’ farm populations. 
Availability per household has been highest in 
the north in all years, but increasing regional 
equity has meant that supply to the north 
declined sharply from 2007/8 to 2009/10. 
Supply per farm family in the central region also 
shows a very sharp decline, to match supply in 
the southern region .
Given	that	there	is	both	higher	poverty	incidence	and	
a greater number of poor people in the southern region 
than in the centre and north, reference back to table 2.1 
suggests that this switch of coupon allocations to the 
south should have led to increased subsidy access by 
poor people. This in turn should lead to
•	 reduced	 displacement	 of	 unsubsidised	
purchases by subsidised purchases, 
•	 increased	incremental	production,	and	
•	 increased	maize	and	labour	market	effects	
benefiting poor non-beneficiaries as well as 
poor beneficiaries (School of Oriental and 
African	Studies	et	al.,	2008,	Dorward,	2010).
With regard to achievement of various possible 
programme objectives examined earlier in Table 2, these 
effects should (other things being equal) improve 
programme effectiveness and efficiency in promoting 
national and household food production, self-sufficiency, 
food security, social protection and poverty reduction 
(for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries). These 
effects may, however, be undermined if incremental 
production per unit incremental inputs is lower for new 
beneficiaries in the south as compared with previous 
beneficiaries in the centre and north, if targeting of the 
poor is less effective in the south than in the north and 
centre, and by variability in subsidy distribution per 
Figure 4 Estimates of fertiliser voucher redemption 
per household by region by year using NSO rural 
household estimates 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit (2011), NSO(2008), MVAC 
livelihood zone data.
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household between districts within regions. These 
changes would not appear to have any links to strategies 
for area graduation (as there is no change in the actual 
areas being subsidised, only in the intensity of subsidy 
in each area). There is also no evidence that they will 
have any positive or negative impact on environmental 
protection.
4.2 Beneficiary targeting outcomes
Descriptive	statistics	on	receipt	of	subsidy	coupons	
by households with different characteristics are reported 
for 2006/7 by School of Oriental and African Studies et 
al.,	2008,	for	2008/9	by	Dorward	et	al.,	2010	and	for	
20010/11	by	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011a.	In	addition	
School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) and 
Chirwa et al., 2010b provide regression analyses of 
household characteristics associated with subsidy 
receipt. We do not attempt to provide a detailed 
description of the findings of these studies, but note the 
following general observations:
•	 There	is	a	general	tendency	for	characteristics	
associated with less poor households to be 
associated with greater likelihood of receiving 
subsidy coupons and (among those receiving 
coupons) of receiving more coupons 
(characteristics such as larger land holdings, 
male rather than femaleheaded households, 
higher value of assets owned, and better 
subjective assessment of welfare). 
•	 There	is	however	evidence	from	2008/9	data	
that households with salary income are less 
likely to receive subsidised inputs
•	 There	is	also	evidence	from	2008/9	data	that	
distribution of coupons in open meetings 
increases the probability of poorer households 
receiving subsidised inputs
•	 There	is	little	other	evidence	that	the	proportion	
of relatively poorer households receiving the 
subsidy has increased from 2006/7 to 2010/11 
– as a result of either changes in area allocations 
or changes in beneficiary targeting criteria or 
processes (as discussed earlier). However, this 
issue could benefit from further investigation 
and analysis. 
•	 Dorward	et	al.,	2010	and	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	
2011a also report (for 2008/9 and 2010/11 
respectively) rural people’s perceptions of what 
types of households are more or less likely to 
receive coupons. These do not suggest any 
strong targeting to benefit poorer or more 
vulnerable households, nor any increases in 
such targeting.
•	 There	is	also	evidence	that	the	proportion	of	
households who lose or gain coupons as a result 
of redistribution (those household with only 
one coupon) has increased steadily from 2006/7 
to 2010/11 (from 27% to 36% to 41% across 
2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11) and that this is 
most common and has increased most in the 
south. However, apart from a lower occurrence 
of redistribution in the North, the changes 
appear to be largely the result of increases in 
the numbers of coupons and proportions of 
households receiving coupons in the south – if 
we examine the households receiving 1 coupon 
as a percentage of households receiving any 
coupons (i.e. excluding households not 
receiving any coupons), then this remains 
relatively constant across the three survey 
seasons (around 30% in the North, between 52 
and 63% in the centre, and around 57% in the 
south, as shown in Table 3). However, analysis 
of the characteristics of households receiving 
one coupon shows a persistent pattern of 
poverty across all three years - land and other 
asset holdings and subjective welfare indicators 
suggest that across different survey years these 
households are consistently nearly as poor as, 
or sometimes poorer than, households not 
receiving any coupons. This suggests that when 
redistribution occurs it is poorer households 
who share one of their coupons (less poor 
households with two coupons tend to hold 
onto both), and poorer households who receive 
the redistributed coupons. 
Table 3 Percentage of all households and of recipient households by coupons received by year
Coupons/hh zero 1 coupon/hh 2 coupons/hh >2 coupons/hh
Survey year 06/7 08/9 10/11 06/7 08/9 10/11 06/7 08/9 10/11 06/7 08/9 10/11
% all households by number of coupons /hh
North 38% 28% 24% 18% 14% 23% 37% 50% 47% 7% 8% 5%
Centre 45% 35% 31% 28% 39% 38% 21% 20% 24% 5% 3% 1%
South 49% 33% 11% 28% 37% 47% 19% 24% 35% 4% 3% 2%
National  46% 33% 21% 27% 36% 41% 22% 25% 31% 5% 3% 2%
% recipient households by number of coupons/hh
North na na na 29% 19% 31% 60% 69% 63% 11% 11% 7%
Centre na na na 52% 63% 60% 39% 32% 38% 9% 5% 2%
South na na na 55% 58% 56% 37% 38% 42% 8% 5% 2%
National  na na na 50% 56% 55% 41% 39% 42% 9% 5% 3%
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Despite	the	changes	in	targeting	criteria	and	processes	
reported above, and changes in area targeting outcomes, 
examination of beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
characteristics suggests that beneficiary targeting 
outcomes have not changed much from 2006/7 to 
2010/11, and that targeting continues to tend to favour 
the non-poor. This involves both exclusion errors (with 
exclusion of poor and vulnerable households who ought 
to be included according to the targeting criteria) and 
inclusion errors (with inclusion of less poor households 
who ought to be excluded according to the targeting 
criteria). However, the lack of clarity in targeting criteria 
and the large numbers of relatively less poor people (who 
can nevertheless be considered to meet the targeting 
criteria) make it difficult to identify exclusion and 
inclusion errors with any precision or confidence.
5. Targeting Options
In considering targeting options we consider first 
different outcomes that targeting systems might aim 
for, taking account of practical difficulties likely to be 
encountered in aiming for these different outcomes. We 
will then consider potential targeting systems for 
achieving desired targeting outcomes. In this discussion 
area targeting and beneficiary targeting within areas will 
be considered separately, although overall beneficiary 
targeting outcomes depend upon interactions between 
area targeting and beneficiary targeting within areas. 
5.1 Targeting outcomes
Area targeting outcomes would ideally by analysed 
by examining coverage and ratios of subsidy sales to 
rural households by MVAC livelihood zone. Unfortunately 
this is difficult as zones are not co-terminous with 
districts, and not all zones were sampled in the 2010/11 
household survey. Table 4 presents results from an 
analysis using a rough categorisation of districts by 
higher, middle and low altitude (which approximates to 
higher, medium and lower maize production importance 
and potential). This suggests that higher potential areas 
were generally allocated proportionally more coupons 
than low potential areas in 2010/11, but the analysis is 
complicated by regional differences (for example 
northern districts generally having higher proportional 
allocations) and agro-ecological variations within 
districts.	Differentiation	between	allocations	to	higher	
and lower altitude districts appears to have diminished 
between 2006/7 and 2010/11. 
In districts with lower allocations relative to population, 
this normally involved reduced allocations across the 
board, rather than the complete exclusion of significant 
areas. Political considerations make it difficult to exclude 
significant areas unless other alternative transfers are 
made to compensate for the lack of subsidised maize 
production inputs. There is no evidence that there is 
greater proportionate allocation to districts with more 
poor households (the correlation coefficient between 
the estimated number of poor rural households and total 
bag sales is smaller than the correlation coefficient 
between the total number of rural households and total 
bag sales). However, the correlation between subsidy 
sales and poor rural households per district increased 
substantially from 2006/7 to 2010/11 (the correlation 
coefficient increased from 0.59 to 0.73) while there was 
only a very small increase in the correlation between 
subsidy sales and total rural households per district (from 
0.83 to 0.87). This is the result largely of the shift in district 
coupon allocations noted earlier, from districts with lower 
numbers of poor people in the north and centre to 
districts with larger numbers of poor people in the south.
Table 5 shows beneficiary targeting outcomes 
achieved in 2010/11 in terms of the proportions of 
households in different wellbeing / poverty classifications 
receiving different amounts of subsidised fertiliser (using 
households own perceptions of their wellbeing / 
poverty). As discussed earlier in section 4.2, this does not 
suggest that beneficiary targeting is particularly targeted 
at the poor.
We therefore now consider four possible alternative 
patterns of beneficiary targeting objectives, set out in 
Table 6. We consider first a universal but smaller per 
household subsidy that may provide for 50kg of fertiliser 
to all rural households (we term this the ‘universal 
programme’), second ‘tighter pro-poor targeting ‘ where 
the same total volume of subsidised fertiliser is targeted 
with a 100kg ration to the poorest households, and third 
‘pro-poor mixed targeting’ where the same proportion 
of households get 100kg and the same proportion of 
households get 50kg fertiliser as in 2010/11 as set out 
in table 5.2, but the poorest households get 100kg, less 
poor households get 50kg, and the least poor get none. 
The fourth pattern of beneficiary targeting, ‘regressive 
Table 4 Distribution of subsidy coupons by district altitude categories
District altitude 
category
No of 
districts
Rural 
households
Subsidy fertiliser sales 
2010/11 (bags)
Standardised subsidy 
sales/hh (relative to mean)
2010/11 Total Per rural hh 2010/11 2006/7
Higher (Plateau) 18 4,465,105 5,677,948 1.35 1.10 1.26
Medium (Lakeshore) 7 484,957 478,863 1.03 0.84 0.62
Low (Lower Shire) 2 146,395 53,218 0.36 0.30 0.10
Total 27 5,096,457 6,210,029 1.22 1.00 1.00
Source: Calculated from 2010/11 household survey
Working Paper 066 www.future-agricultures.org11
mixed targeting’ provides the same proportion of 
households with 100kg, 50kg and no subsidised fertiliser 
as the ‘pro-poor mixed’ pattern, but prioritises allocations 
to the less poor rather than to the poor. The targeting 
patterns these four approaches would aim to achieve 
are set out in Table 7.
We may now consider the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these targeting patterns, 
against their likely achievement of the programme 
objectives set out above.
Universal provision of 50kg fertiliser is effectively 
legitimising and extending the widespread practice of 
Table 5 Beneficiary targeting outcomes, 2010/11: % hh by subsidy receipt and poverty / well being group
Subsidy receipt (bags fertiliser /hh)
Poverty/ wellbeing group No subsidy 1 bag or less More than 1 bag All hh
Poorest Ovutikitsitsa) 6% 10% 5% 21%
Poor (Ovutika) 8% 19% 13% 39%
A bit poor           (Ovutikilako) 5% 12% 8% 25%
A bit better off  (Wapakatikati & better) 3% 4% 8% 15%
All households 21% 45% 34% 100%
Table 6 Alternative beneficiary targeting patterns
Subsidy receipt (bags fertiliser /hh)
Poverty/ wellbeing group No subsidy 1 bag or less More than 1 bag All hh
a.  Universal, 50 kg fertiliser to all households
Poorest        (Ovutikitsitsa) 0% 21% 0% 21%
Poor (Ovutika) 0% 39% 0% 39%
A bit poor           (Ovutikilako) 0% 25% 0% 25%
A bit better off  (Wapakatikati & better) 0% 15% 0% 15%
All households 0% 100% 0% 100%
b.  Tighter pro-poor targeting100 kg fertiliser to the poor
Poorest        (Ovutikitsitsa) 0% 0% 21% 21%
Poor (Ovutika) 4% 0% 36% 39%
A bit poor           (Ovutikilako) 25% 0% 0% 25%
A bit better off  (Wapakatikati & better) 15% 0% 0% 15%
All households 44% 0% 56% 100%
c.   Mixed targeting to the poor
Poorest        (Ovutikitsitsa) 0% 0% 21% 21%
Poor (Ovutika) 0% 26% 13% 39%
A bit poor           (Ovutikilako) 7% 19% 0% 25%
A bit better off  (Wapakatikati & better) 15% 0% 0% 15%
All households 21% 45% 34% 100%
d.   Mixed targeting to the less poor
Poorest        (Ovutikitsitsa) 21% 0% 0% 21%
Poor (Ovutika) 1% 39% 0% 39%
A bit poor           (Ovutikilako) 0% 6% 19% 25%
A bit better off  (Wapakatikati & better) 0% 0% 15% 15%
All households 21% 45% 34% 100%
Note: Poverty/wellbeing groups are based on a ladder of six steps ranging from poorest (locally known as Ovutikitsitsa) to rich (Opeza 
bwino kwambiri/Olemera)
Source: Calculated from 2010/11 household survey
Note: Poverty/wellbeing groups are based on a ladder of six steps ranging from poorest (locally known as Ovutikitsitsa) to rich (Opeza 
bwino kwambiri/Olemera)
Source: Authors’ estimates
Table 7 Relative advantages and disadvantages of different targeting patterns, against likely achievement of the programme objectives
Targeting outcomes& effects Programme objectives / impacts
Area poverty 
targeting
Beneficiary 
poverty targeting 
within areas
Displacement Productivity Incremental 
production, 
national food 
self-sufficiency & 
security 
Beneficiary food 
self-sufficiency & 
security 
Wider food 
security & 
pro-poor 
growth
Area 
graduation
Beneficiary 
graduation
Universal 
provision of 50kg 
fertiliser
Potentially low 
cost & effective 
implementation 
but political 
difficulties 
?? Theory & practice 
aligned, similar to 
2010/11
Similar to 
2010/11
OK OK OK ?? ?? Difficult to reach 
thresholds?
Tight pro-poor 
targeting of 
100kg fertiliser
High cost & 
difficult 
Implementation
?? Good in theory, 
practice difficult
May be good 
in theory but 
poor in 
practice
?? ?? good but only if 
actually 
implemented
?? ?? May be good 
but only if 
actually 
implemented
Mixed pro-poor 
targeting of 50 & 
100kg fertiliser
High cost & 
difficult 
Implementation
?? Good in theory, 
practice difficult
May be good 
in theory but 
poor in 
practice
?? ?? good but only if 
actually 
implemented
?? ?? May be good 
but only if 
actually 
implemented
Mixed regressive 
targeting of 50 & 
100kg fertiliser
Potentially low 
cost & effective 
implementation 
but political 
difficulties?
?? Regressive 
targeting
Likely to be 
high
?? High 
displacement so 
limited 
productivity 
gains
Limited change 
due to limited 
incremental 
production
Limited change 
due to limited 
incremental 
production
Limited 
change due 
to limited 
incremental 
production
Limited change 
due to limited 
incremental 
production
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redistribution discussed earlier. It has a number of 
advantages (School of Oriental and African Studies et 
al., 2008):
•	 It	 eliminates	 the	 costs	 and	 difficulties	 of	
targeting
•	 It	dramatically	 increases	 transparency	and	
accountability, as all rural households know that 
they are entitled to a set of subsidised inputs
•	 As	 a	 result , 	 there	 should	 be	 a	 high	
correspondence between planned targeting 
outcomes and those actually achieved
•	 It	would	 increase	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	
programme in targeting the poor as compared 
with 2010/11 targeting outcomes by eliminating 
exclusion errors. Although there would be some 
increase in inclusion errors measured in terms 
of less poor households receiving fertilisers, 
because they would only receive one bag the 
total quantity of fertiliser going to less poor 
households would be about the same. It may 
then be argued that this is a better outcome 
than the 2010/11 outcome given the large 
numbers of poor households in most rural areas 
in Malawi – especially if the key test of inclusion 
errors is the extent to which they increase 
displacement and depress incremental 
production.
•	 Where	inclusion	errors	do	occur,	some	of	this	
may be seen as a transfer to a small numbers 
of less poor farmers to compensate them for 
lower prices for surplus maize production. 
There are, however, also a number of difficulties with 
this approach.
•	 It	may	appear	to	be	a	reversion	to	the	former	
‘starter pack’ approach implemented by a 
previous government in 1999/2000 and 
2000/2001 (Levy, 2005) although there are 
substantial differences with the larger scale of 
the subsidised ‘pack’ and in its objectives. 
Nevertheless, this is a significant political issue. 
•	 There	are	concerns	that	incremental	production	
from a smaller (100kg fertiliser plus seed) ration 
of subsidised inputs for each household may 
not provide poor households with enough of 
a productivity boost to ‘lift’ them over the 
productivity and asset threshold that keeps 
them in a low productivity trap. This is a concern 
raised by a number of rural people in focus 
group discussions (Chirwa et al. (2011)). The 
importance of this is very difficult to determine 
as the effectiveness of subsidy in raising 
household productivity and assets above the 
threshold and the nature and importance of 
the threshold receipt depends not only on the 
size of the subsidy pack but also on its delivery 
(for example timing), on overall incremental 
production from the programme, and on 
complementary investments and policies 
concerning, for example, agricultural extension, 
support for integrated soil fertility management, 
maize prices, input market development, and 
wider development of the non-farm economy 
(see	Dorward	and	Chirwa,	2011b).	There	 is	
substantial scope for improving effectiveness 
in many of these areas, and in particular the 
introduction of this system might itself promote 
greater incremental productivity (through 
more effective targeting, reduced targeting 
work burdens on extension staff, and greater 
farmer confidence in subsidy receipt) and this 
concern might then not be important.
•	 Another	concern	arises	regarding	processes	for	
implementing and achieving graduation. 
Graduation	 with	 a	 thoroughly	 universal	
programme can only be achieved if the whole 
programme is withdrawn from all beneficiaries 
and areas at the same time. Some form of 
staggered progressions would mean that either 
area or beneficiary targeting is no longer 
universal. Progressive beneficiary graduation 
and targeting would undermine the core 
benefits of universal targeting outlined above. 
This might not be the case with progressive 
area graduation and targeting, but there would 
be very substantial political and practical 
challenges with implementing this – but 
perhaps not much different from challenges 
with progressive area graduation and targeting 
in other contexts.
•	 Although	the	universal	right	to	a	fixed	subsidy	
would offer opportunities for significant 
practical benefits in improving transparency 
and accountability and lowering targeting 
costs, as discussed above, it does not address 
(and may even exacerbate) a major practical 
challenge, the determination of the number of 
eligible farm families in each area and in the 
country	as	a	whole.	Difficulties	in	determining	
the number of farm families were alluded to 
earlier (in sections 3.1 and 4.1), with MoAFS farm 
family registrations growing annually by 9.1% 
and 2.2% in the Central and Southern regions 
respectively from 2005/6 to 2009/10, and erratic 
variations between years being mutually 
inconsistent and inconsistent with NSO 
estimates of 1% inter-censual growth in rural 
households and with farm family numbers 
apparently inconsistent with 2008 census 
returns. The pressures and processes that 
encourage the creation of ‘ghost households’ 
and the splitting of households for subsidy 
registration may be intensified with a universal 
subsidy. On the other hand the accurate 
determination and registration of farm families 
is a challenge that is faced whatever targeting 
approach is adopted. 
Tight pro-poor targeting of 100kg fertiliser is broadly 
the approach that is currently supposed to be used. If 
implemented effectively then this would provide the 
lowest displacement and has the highest pro-poor 
growth potential. As discussed in sections 3 and 4, 
however, there are serious difficulties in applying this 
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method and as a result targeting outcomes do not match 
aspirations. Proposals to improve the implementation 
of this approach need to address current difficulties in 
both setting measurable targeting criteria and in applying 
these criteria in targeting. Since these apply to all systems 
except the universal system, we discuss these separately 
below. 
Attention also needs to be paid to the processes of 
coupon redemption, as these can be highly exclusionary 
to poorer and more vulnerable people (Mvula et al., 2011). 
Options here include distribution centre committees, 
more private sector involvement in subsidised input sales 
(to promote competition), more and more effective 
market monitoring and auditing, and better integration 
with cash transfers for the productive poor who cannot 
afford redemption payments.
Mixed pro-poor targeting of 50 and 100kg fertiliser is 
perhaps closer to the approach that is currently actually 
used, where there is redistribution and sharing of subsidy 
coupons. However, whereas in the current system most 
redistribution seems to involve sharing by poor recipients 
with poor non-recipients, a more pro-poor approach 
would prioritise poorer recipients keeping their 100kg 
fertiliser allocation, while less poor recipients would get 
50kg each, and the least poor would get nothing. This 
may be seen as something of a halfway house between 
the universal and tight pro-poor targeting approaches 
outlined earlier. While it lacks the strong transparency 
and accountability of the universal approach, it may 
provide better targeting, and may be more acceptable 
and have wider community support than the tight 
pro-poor approach, and consequently may be more 
easily implemented – but it will still run up against the 
interests groups of powerful people who may be 
excluded from subsidy benefits, and will still face 
challenges in setting and applying targeting criteria to 
identify target households. The options for addressing 
this discussed above for tight pro-poor targeting will 
also be relevant here. This approach might also allow a 
natural beneficiary graduation system as when 
households became better off then they could be shifted 
from a 100kg fertiliser allocation to a 50kg allocation and 
eventually the subsidy could be withdrawn.
Mixed regressive targeting of 50 & 100kg fertiliser would 
give more regressive outcomes than the current system 
(see tables 5.2 and 5.3d) and is included here to provide 
a comparison. Table 5.4 suggests that it has little to 
commend it as high displacement means it offers limited 
impact on the main programme objectives, and would 
be inferior to the current system.
6. Options for Identifying 
Beneficiaries
The development of methods for better identification 
of targeted beneficiaries is a key requirement for 
improving targeting, unless it is accepted that difficulties 
with this (together with power, politics and problems of 
lack of accountability and transparency) make the 
universal approach the best practical approach. 
Three broad approaches may be considered: proxy 
wealth and income measures, community targeting, and 
identification by traditional leaders. 
With regard to proxy wealth and income measures, 
Houssou and Zeller, 2011 propose an indicator based 
system for setting targeting criteria and argue that this 
approach would be more target and cost effective than 
the 2006/7 system in improving welfare transfers to the 
poor6. There is certainly potential merit in the use of 
objective indicators, however, there are potential major 
costs and challenges in gathering accurate and reliable 
data on household indicators and in ensuring that these 
indicators are used properly in the processes of subsidy 
allocations to households. This approach also
1. presupposes that the integrated household 
survey data and its estimation of income 
poverty (with its various challenges7) provide 
more valid poverty measures than more 
subjective local definitions which may take 
account of wider definitions of poverty8,
2. presupposes that poverty targeting is the most 
effective way of meeting the range of 
programme objectives as discussed above, 
3. does not recognise the complex interactions 
between area and beneficiary targeting that 
are important in the practicalities of targeting, 
and 
4. does not pay sufficient attention to difficulties 
associated with the large number of households 
clustered around the poverty cut-off point, and 
hence local concerns about ‘fairness’9.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that a relatively small 
set of fixed indicators provide explicit and objective 
criteria for subsidy access is valuable, and it would be 
useful to consider and develop alternative ways of 
implementing this. Thus, for example, criteria might be 
developed by a process of participatory consultations 
with rural people, and a small number of low cost 
indicators (say three of four) be combined into a points 
system which is used to rank households in terms of their 
priority for subsidy allocation within villages (that is for 
beneficiary targeting rather than area targeting). Any 
such system would run counter to the interests of 
entrenched less poor interest groups, but it might be 
possible to overcome these with strong commitment to 
enforcing of more transparent and accountable allocation 
and distribution processes. This might be achieved with, 
for example, completely open processes (though the 
costs of participation and social conventions may mean 
that poorer people are often excluded even from 
processes that are nominally or appear to be completely 
open) and/or published lists of recipients and of the 
criteria used in allocation (although there are also 
important sensitivities and issues of confidentiality here).
It might also be possible to differentiate between the 
productive and non-productive poor (with the latter 
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being provided with cash transfers rather than production 
subsidies). There may be useful lessons here from 
consideration of experience with cash transfer 
programmes and the potential for combining subsidy 
and	cash	transfer	programmes	(Ellis	and	Maliro,	2011	).	
In a separate study of public works programmes, Chirwa 
et al., 2012b, found that 13.6 percent of beneficiaries of 
public works spent their wages on purchase of subsidized 
fertilizers. However, most of the public works programmes 
studied	were	implemented	in	November	and	December	
which was some time after redemption of fertilizer 
coupons had started – indeed, some beneficiaries 
borrowed money to redeem coupons and used the wage 
to repay the loan. They note that better timing of public 
works could have improved their complementarity with 
the subsidy programme.
Community targeting is the approach that is supposed 
to be used for identifying beneficiaries in the FISP, with 
the involvement of open meetings. Household survey 
data	and	FGDs	have	persistently	shown	very	 large	
variability between targeting processes and outcomes 
across the country. In general targeting is less contentious 
in the northern region, and is dominated more by 
traditional leaders in the Centre. There is widespread 
concern that traditional leaders, government officials 
and other members of the local elite are appropriating 
coupons and/or directing them to themselves and /or 
their friends and relatives. While failures to target the 
poor are evident (as discussed earlier) the extent of 
diversion is very difficult to establish. However, the 
perception of diversion is promoted by lack of 
transparency in allocation, misunderstanding of coupon 
allocations and targeting processes, and widespread 
belief that there should be more coupons – and 
sometimes that there should be enough for everyone 
and any shortfall is due to misappropriation. These 
problems are not new, and similar problems and patters 
of problems were detailed by Chinsinga et al., 2002 when 
studying targeting in the 2001-2 TIP programme. They 
concluded that it was difficult for targeting to be 
perceived to be fair if less than around 80% of households 
were targeted (more in the south and less in the north) 
and community targeting needed fairly intensive and 
costly training and facilitation with checks and balances 
to stop inputs being captured by local elites.
The third approach is the use of traditional leaders in 
the identification of beneficiaries. This is currently 
happening in targeting FISP beneficiaries and public 
works programmes in which surveys have shown that 
most beneficiaries are identified by traditional leaders. 
This system in part has evolved from the failure by the 
community to implement community based targeting. 
The assumption is that traditional leaders know the 
difficulties their subjects experience and have better 
information on who is poor and needs assistance in the 
community. Although this system is cost effective due 
to use of local capacity, there are widespread complaints 
about fairness and inclusion of households that are in 
cahoots with the traditional leadership and bring their 
own criteria for targeting. Such a system also lacks 
transparency, as culturally it is not typical that subjects 
openly question the decision of the traditional leaders 
(Chirwa et al., 2012b).
7. Conclusions
This paper has examined targeting issues that emerge 
from the 2010/11 and earlier FISP evaluations, and puts 
forward various options for improving targeting.
Targeting objectives depend upon programme 
objectives. There is a key distinction between area and 
beneficiary targeting. Targeting affects achievement of 
programme objectives through its impacts on 
displacement, productivity of input use, the direct 
benefits to beneficiaries, and wider economic, social and 
environmental benefits. Achievement of these benefits 
is generally supported by pro-poor targeting, through 
lower displacement and stronger growth linkages, but 
the effects of pro-poor targeting on input productivity 
are not known. Relations of targeting with area and 
beneficiary graduation and with environmental benefits 
are complex. 
Area and beneficiary targeting outcomes (actual 
patterns of subsidy receipt) depend on targeting criteria 
and processes as well as on coupon distribution, 
redistribution and redemption processes. Shifts in 
relative area allocations, from the Northern and Central 
Regions to the Southern Region, have brought allocations 
more in line with rural population distribution, and there 
have also been reductions in the use of less transparent 
and more informal supplementary allocations. Recent 
beneficiary targeting criteria also place more emphasis 
on poor and vulnerable farmers. This is associated with 
more formal processes of farmer registration and of 
coupon allocation and distribution, the latter in open 
meetings (though it is not clear how far these meetings 
opened up the process of allocation or merely made the 
announcement of allocations more transparent). Less 
formal redistribution of coupons by local traditional 
leaders (after formal distribution by government staff) 
has been an enduring feature of the process, especially 
in the Central and Southern regions. 
Increased correlation between coupon allocations to 
districts and numbers of poor rural households per 
district appears to have been a result of shifts of coupons 
to the South. However there is no clear evidence of 
increased likelihood of the poor benefiting from changes 
in beneficiary targeting, in 2008/9, except that in 2008/9 
open meetings were associated with greater likelihood 
of the poor receiving coupons. Redistribution tends to 
affect poorer households, both as donors and recipients 
of shared coupons. 
As regards options for improving patterns of coupon 
distribution among poorer and less poor households, 
regressive patterns appear to be undesirable due to 
associated high displacement (leading to low incremental 
production even if there is higher input productivity) 
and low linkage effects. ‘Tight pro-poor targeting ‘ is the 
current desired outcome, but difficulties in setting criteria 
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and with distribution and redistribution processes lead 
to outcomes that are very different from those that are 
desired. To address these difficulties we suggest 
•	 Mechanisms	for	improving	targeting	criteria	
(e.g. use of indicators and points systems) and 
processes (e.g. published lists and more 
genuinely participative open meetings); 
•	 Consideration	of	‘looser’	targeting	objectives,	
to allow 100kg of subsidised fertiliser for some 
households and 50kg for other households (as 
currently observed as a result of redistribution), 
but with greater emphasis on 100 kg for poor 
households and 50 kg of fertiliser for less poor 
households. Targeting criteria and processes 
would need to be improved, as discussed 
above. 
•	 Consideration	of	a	more	universal	approach,	
with 50 kg of subsidised fertiliser for all 
households. Although this represents a lower 
aspiration for pro-poor targeting, greater 
transparency and accountability may lead to 
all poorer households actually receiving 
coupons, without any increase in coupons 
going to less poor households. Practical, 
political and graduation challenges, however, 
would need to be addressed before such a 
system could be implemented. 
Investigation of differential input productivity on poor 
and less poor farms is an important (but difficult) field 
of further research. Research is also needed on relations 
between targeting on the one hand, and area and 
beneficiary graduation and environmental benefits on 
the other.
Notes
i Ricker-Gilbert	et	al.,	2010	report	that	participation	
in unsubsidised fertiliser purchase is depressed 
with increasing distance to a paved road, whereas 
subsidised purchases increase with distance to 
a paved road. Chirwa et al., 2011 do not find any 
significant effect of distance to paved road on 
participation in unsubsidised fertiliser purchases. 
 ii School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008 
and Chirwa et al., 2010a discuss the processes of 
and influences on wider growth processes from 
the FISP. 
iii	 Duflo	et	 al.,	 2009	find	 in	Kenya	 that	early	 and	
discounted availability of fertilisers may promote 
purchases of fertiliser with only very small 
subsidies.  
iv The proportion of households reporting receipt 
of one fertiliser coupon rose from 27% in 2006/7 
to 36% in 2008/9 to 41% in 2010/11, with the 
highest incidence and rates of increase reported 
in the south (where it rose from 28% in 2006/7 
to 37% in 2008/9 to 47% in 2010/11). This increase 
appears to be largely the result of increased 
coupon allocations to the centre and south, 
particularly the latter, where redistribution is 
most common (the proportion of coupons being 
redistributed remained relatively constant across 
years within each region, but was persistently 
higher in the south and centre and lower in the 
north).  
v Central region supply per farm household 
recorded by MoAFS is below that of the Southern 
region in later years, due to the very high 
increases in farm families registered by the 
MoAFS in later years. 
 vi Ten indicators are proposed (household size, 
radio ownership, cement floor of house, bicycle 
ownership, use of electricity for lighting, panga 
ownership, educational qualification in 
household , use of bed net, rubbish disposal 
facility, and household head literacy) and also 
area based factors based on Agricultural 
Development	Divisions.	
 vii See for example Chirwa et al., 2012a on poverty 
estimation difficulties as a result of seasonality
 viii See for example World Bank, 2000 for discussion 
of issues such as vulnerability, power, voice, 
assets, wealth and well being as poverty concepts 
alongside income or expenditure measures. 
 ix Houssou and Zeller do consider different patterns 
of distribution, including a ‘fair targeting’ 
approach that does not lift anyone above the 
poverty line – but this involves reducing subsidy 
receipts for households just below the poverty 
line to  ensure that it does not lift them over it 
– a very challenging process, both politically and 
administratively. 
x Maliro (2011) reports that targeting has been 
quite successful in Malawian pilot cash transfer 
programmes, but much less successful in rolling 
out of larger scale programmes.
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